Recent reports have alleged that the United States was aware of and actively involved in facilitating a significant offensive led by the al-Qaeda-linked group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), aimed at toppling Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. The Telegraph revealed that the US had notified the Revolutionary Commando Army (RCA), a militia it funds and trains at the Al Tanf military base in southern Syria, to prepare for an imminent shift in the region’s power dynamics. The RCA was informed that they had an opportunity to either see Assad removed from power or risk their own downfall, although the specifics of the forthcoming attack remained vague to militia leaders.
In a strategic maneuver, the US had expanded the RCA by integrating several other Sunni militias, raising its numbers from around 800 to approximately 3,000 fighters. These troops are supplied with American weaponry and are compensated with salaries funded by the US government. While the RCA operates separately, it is noteworthy that the US also supports the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in eastern Syria. As the HTS offensively advanced southward from Idlib province, the RCA moved in a northward direction, capitalizing on the shifting battle lines in Syria’s complex war.
The collaboration between the RCA and HTS during this offensive appears to have been facilitated by US coordination from the Al Tanf base. This strategic partnership seemingly marks a controversial willingness on the part of the US to work alongside an organization that they have designated as a terrorist group, given HTS’s historical ties to al-Qaeda. The US has celebrated certain victories in Syria, showcasing a readiness to embrace alliances that might have previously been deemed unacceptable, in pursuit of implementing their broader geopolitical goals.
Reports indicate that US awareness of the HTS offensive began as early as November, just weeks prior to the initiation of the assault. RCA fighters were informed that the US sought to exploit this situation not only to diminish Assad’s grip on power but also to prevent ISIS from reclaiming territory. The ongoing conflict has rendered the situation fluid, as the US’s strategic priorities seem to shift in coordination with emerging battlefield realities, including the resurgence of ISIS as a pertinent threat.
Despite the complexities of involvement with groups like HTS, the Biden administration has taken steps to engage directly with its leadership. A recent high-level visit to Damascus involved discussions with Mohammed Abu al-Julani, the head of HTS, who was previously designated as a terrorist and had a bounty of $10 million on his head from the US government. This signifies a notable shift in US diplomatic engagement in Syria, potentially reshaping the dynamics of both regional alliances and the ongoing conflict.
The overarching implications of these developments illustrate a nuanced and often contradictory American foreign policy in Syria. The budding cooperation with HTS highlights the lengths to which the US may go to influence the outcome of the Syrian civil war, in pursuit of interests that prioritize the repression of ISIS and the destabilization of the Assad regime. As the tug-of-war continues between various factions, the role of the US as both an ally and a strategic player remains fraught with challenges, moral complexities, and long-term ramifications for the region as a whole.
